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Statutory Construction:
Maryland State Police Ordered To
Obey Agency's Own Regulation
By Professor Byron L. Warnken

In Zeigler v. Maryland St4te Police, I the
Circuit Court for Baltimore County, applying principles of statutory construction, ordered the Maryland State Police to
follow the agency's own regulation regarding the appointment of disciplinary hearing boards. At the same time, Judge
Edward A. DeWaters, Jr., resolved an issue
of jurisdiction in favor of the plaintiff, resolved issues of severance and attorney's
fees in favor of the defendant, and provided some guidance on a constitutional issue
based on due process.
FACTS
The plaintiff, First Sergeant John M.
Zeigler, assigned to the Maryland State
Police Academy, was administratively
charged with knowingly submitting a false
report,2 endorsing an incomplete report,3
interfering with cases assigned to other officers,· and neglecting duty by failing to
take appropriate action. 5 All charges were
based on allegedly concealing information
relating to a sexual relationship between
another member of the academy staff and
a recruit. The State Police also charged a
captain with three violations and a first
lieutenant with two violations.
The permanent chair of the disciplinary
hearing board issued Special Order 01-87260, which provided, in pertinent part, the
following:
This board consists of five members
who will hear the entire case against all
three defendants and participate in the

decision making process pertaining to
motions, evidence, etc. However, the
decision on verdict and penalty on
each defendant will be decided on
upon [sic] by Major ["A"], Captain
["B"] and the member of the board
equal in rank to the defendant being
considered at the time, i.e., Major
["A"], Captain ["B"] and Captain
["C1"] will decide the verdict and
penalty in the case of [accused captain
"X"]; Major ["A"], Captain ["B"] and
First Lieutenant ["C-2"] will decide
the verdict and penalty in the case of
[accused lieutenant "Y"]; and Major
["A"], Captain ["B"] and First Sergeant ["C-3"] will decide the penalty
and verdict in the case of First Sergeant
Zeigler.
Zeigler filed a motion to have the three
cases tried separately, each before a separate three-member hearing board. The motion was denied by the chair of the
five-member hearing board. Zeigler then
filed, pursuant to the Law Enforcement
Officers' Bill of Rights (LEOBOR), 6 an application for a show cause order7 in the
Circuit Court for Baltimore County. An
accompanying memorandum of law made
two arguments, one statutory and one constitutional.
The essence of the statutory construction argument was as follows: The
Superintendent of the Maryland State
Police, pursuant to a delegation of authority from the legislature, promulgated an ad-

ministrative regulation mandating that the
permanent hearing board chair shall appoint a three-member hearing board. The
only discretion provided by the regulation
is whether the permanent chair will serve
on a given board. Nonetheless, the permanent chair appointed a five-member hearing board in this case. The failure of the
State Police to comply with its own mandatory regulation renders invalid any action taken by the improperly constituted
board.
The essense of the constitutional argument was as follows: Administrative agency due process is determined by balancing
(1) the private interest affected by official
action, (2) the risk of depriving that interest through the procedures used and the
availability of remedial procedures, and (3)
the public burden in affording the private
remedy. In this case, the procedure would
make a fair hearing almost impossible. All
five members of the hearing board, simultaneously hearing three separate cases,
would collectively make all legal rulings in
the three cases. Then, three three-member
sub-boards, with two members common
to all su'b-boards, would resolve the issue
of guilt, and, in the event of a guilty finding, recommend punishment. Every finder
of fact sub-board would be tainted by (1)
two original participants then removed, (2)
two finders of fact simultaneously serving
on two other boards, (3) one finder of fact
not serving on two other boards but who
has heard the two other cases for which he
was not on the board, and (4) two finders
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of fact in the second and third cases influenced by knowledge of their verdicts in
whichever case was previously decided.
The readily available remedy, with virtually no burden on the State Police, would be
to appoint a separate three-member hearing board for each of three separate hearings.
JURISDICTION
The State Police argued that the circuit
court lacked jurisdiction because Zeigler
(1) failed to exhaust administrative remedies, and (2) failed to allege a violation of
the LEOBOR. Zeigler responded by argu- .
ing that the circuit court obtained jurisdiction under the "show cause" provision of
the LEOBOR, which provides:
Any law enforcement officer who is
denied any right afforded by this subtitle may apply at any time prior to the
commencement of the hearing before
the hearing board, ... to the circuit
court of the county V?here he is regularly employed for an order direaing
the law enforcement agency to show
cause why the right should not be
afforded.8
Section 734B provides that "this subtitle
shall supersede any State, county or municipal law, ordinance, or regulation that
conflicts with [its] provisions ... "9 The
court of special appeals recognized the legislature's intent in Prince George's County

v. State Commission on Human Relations, 10
and stated that the legislature, in order "to
be certain that all conflicts among prior
statutes and the [LEOBOR] could be readily resolved, ... established the superiority
of the [LEOBOR] in section 734B.... "11
In Chief, Baltimore County Police Depart·
ment v. Marchsteiner,12 the court addressed
the same issue raised by the first contention of the State Police. The court found
that the rights in the LEOBOR are enforced through section 734 and that the
statute "contains no hint of any necessity
of exhausting administrative or grievance
procedures as a precondition to access to
the COUrts."13 The court of special appeals
held that "a legislative purpose in enacting
the LEOB[O]R was to provide an exclusive and self-contained procedure in the
circuit court for assertion of a denial of the
administrative procedure rights embodied
.

• "14

mit.

The defendant's alternative theory was
that even if the court had jurisdiction, the
plaintiff had not alleged an LEOBOR vi~
lation for the court to remedy. Zeigler
argued that if jurisdiction were dependent
upon an enumerated LEOBOR provision,
the court could look to section 727(d) (1)

(the hearing board definition section),15
section 730 (the administrative hearing section),16 and section 733 (the incorporation
of constitutional rights section)P The statutory construction approach of Zeigler's
claim was based on a violation of a mandatory State Police regulation, which was
promulgated to implement sections 727(d)
(1) and 730. 18 Enabling statutes and their
implementing regulations are in pari
materia and the regulations become an
extension of the statute. 19 He argued that
to find a failure to assert an LEOBOR vi~
lation would require a hypertechnical
reading of his application and supporting
memorandum.
However, even assuming no allegation
of an enumerated LEOBOR violation,
Zeigler argued that the defendant's position was fatally flawed by the recent case
of Cochran v. Anderson. 20 In that case, the
Maryland-National Capitol Park and Planning Commission adopted regulations
governing
proceedings
under
the
LEOBOR.21 The circuit court ordered a
termination of all LEOBOR proceedings
because the agency failed to comply with

((the Superintendent
promulgated the
administrative rules
and regulations . .. "

its own regulations. The Commission
appealed, alleging a lack of jurisdiction
because section 734 does not authorize the
circuit court to terminate an LEOBOR
proceeding. In rejecting this argument, the
court of special appeals found that section
734 was designed to enable the circuit
court to provide broad judicial equitable
relief. "It is a very special provision, allowing resort to the court 'prior to the commencement of the hearing before the
hearing board.' The purpose of that provision obviously is ... to assure that the
police agency will do what the law
requires."22 The court held that the circuit
court has wide-ranging authority under
section 734 to fashion an appropriate
remedy, even to the point of terminating
a LEOBOR hearing, and such remedy
may be invoked in response to the agency's violation of its own rules.

Judge DeWaters ruled that the Circuit
Court for Baltimore County had jurisdiction in Zeigler v. Maryland State Police.

STATUrORY CONSTRUCTION
The LEOBOR provides that a disciplinary hearing "shall be conducted by a
hearing board."2J However, the legislature
did not set forth in the "hearing" seaion
(seaion 730) any size or composition
requirements for hearing boards other
than the implicit incorporation of the
definitional· section. The definitional section (section 727 (d) (1» defers the hearing
board decision to the administrative agency, subject to a minimum size requirement
of three and a composition requirement of
at least one member of equal rank to the
accused. 24 The legislature has otherwise
delegated the hearing board size and composition decision to the Superintendent of
State Police.25
Pursuant to this delegation, the Superintendent promulgated the administrative
rules and regulations contained in the
Maryland State Police Administrative
Manual. Chapter 5, section V, subsection
3-2b provides in pertinent part as follows:
The permanent chairman of the hearing board shall, with the Superintendent's authority, appoint ... a threeman[26] board which shall consist of at
least one commissioned officer and
one member of a rank equal to that of
the accused. The permanent chairman,
in his discretion, may serve as a sitting
member of any such board and in
those cases when he chooses not to sit,
one of the appointed commissioned
officers shall be designated as the board
chairman .... 27
Thus, under subsection 3-2b, as to hearing
board size and composition, "[t]he permanent chairman of the hearing board shall
... appoint ... a three-man board which
shall consist of at least one commissioned
officer and one member of a rank equal to
that of the accused."28
Administrative regulations have the
same force of law as the enabling legislation authorizing the agency to promulgate. 29 As the federal district court for
Maryland stated, "once an administrative
agency has promulgated a regulation, even
in instances where it is not required to do
so, that administrative agency is bound to
follow its regulation. This is particularly
true where the regulation uses unambiguous, mandatory language."JO Quoting the
Supreme Court's decision in United St4tes
ex reL Accardi v. Shaughnessy, J1the court of
special appeals stated, in Williams v.
j,[cHugh,J2 that "'[a]n agency of the
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government must scrupulously observe
rules, regulations, or procedures which it
has established. When it fails to do so, its
action cannot stand and courts will strike
it down.' "33 In Vitarelli t'J. Senton, 34 the Supreme Court struck down the adverse personnel action of a federal agency because it
failed to follow its own regulation. Justice
Harlan held that "the Secretary ... was
bound by the regulations which he himself
had promulgated for dealing with such
cases, even though without such regulation
he could have discharged petitioner summarily."35
In interpreting administrative regulations, the Court of Appeals of Maryland
employs the same principles of construction that are used to determine the meaning of statutes.36 "Whenever the word
'shall' is used it is mandatory. Why else
would this word be Used?"37 The term
"shall" establishes an imperative obligation upon the agency and forecloses its exercise of discretion. 38 Such a regulation
creates a mandatory limitation on the
agency, prohibiting action to the contrary.39 This is so even when the reviewing
court believes that the mandatory language
is unwise or its impact is harsh. 40
Assuming arguendo that the State Police
could convince the court that subsection 32b's double use of the term "shall" in the
first sentence does not automatically make
the regulation mandatory, any doubt must
be eliminated by the subsection's striking
change of expression from "shall" to
"may."41 Although the first sentence of
subsection 3-2b provides that the permanent chair "shall" appoint a three-member
board and "shall" have at least one commissioned officer and one member of the
defendant's rank, the second sentence provides as follows: "The permanent chairman, in his discretion, may serve as a sitting
member of any such board and in those
cases when he chooses not to sit, one of the
appointed commissioned officers shall be
designated as the board chairman."42 The
leading treatise on starutory construction
includes the following:
Where both mandatory and directory verbs are used in the same starute,
or in the same section, paragraph, or
sentence of a statute, it is a fair
inference that the legislature realized
the difference in meaning, and intended that the verbs used should carry
with them their ordinary meanings.

This is especially true where «shall" and
«may" are used in close juxtaposition
under circumstances that would indicate that a different treatment is intended for the predicates following
them. 43
Not only are "shall" and "may" juxta-

posed in subsection 3-2b, the only time
that "may" is used, it is accompanied by
the words "in his discretion," whereas
whenever "shall" is used, the accompanying extension of discretion is conspicuous
by its absence. A maxim of statutory construction is expressio unius est exclusio
alterius, meaning that the expression of
one thing is the exclusion of others. This
maxim is most applicable when the drafter
included in one place that which was omitted in another, on the theory that if the
drafter wished to include, the drafter
would have done so, and the failure to include, particularly after inclusion in the
same section, will never be deemed inadvertent. 44
Once determined to be a mandatory regulation, any doubt that the mandate is for
a board of three members - not more and
not less - must be resolved by again applying the principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Subsection 3-2b's manda-

"A maxim of
statutory construction
is expressio unius est
exclusio alterius"

tory requirements for board size and composition are as follows: "The permanent
chairman of the hearing board shall. .. appoint ... a three-man board that shall consist of at least one commissioned officer
and one member of a rank equal to that of
the accused."45 When the Superintendent
intended to give the permanent chair the
option to select a given number or more
than that number, he provided "at least
X." However, when he intended only
"X," the phrase "at least" is conspicuous
by its absence. Thus, the size of the hearing board shall be three. 46
Zeigler argued that resolving the interpretation of subsection 3-2b could not be
more straightforward. The first sentence
places a mandate upon the permanent
hearing board chair to appoint a threemember hearing board. The language is
plain on its face. The result is the same,
whether reached by examining the mandatory language of the first sentence standing
alone or by examining the first sentence by
way of contrast to the permissive language
in the second sentence.
The State Police countered with its own

statutory construction argument. Chapter
5, section V, subsection 3-0 of the
Maryland State Police Administrative
Manual provides as follows:
The rules and regulations in this subsection define policy for the imposition of discipline within the Agency.
These rules and regulations are guides
for handling disciplinary actions and
generally should be followed. In unusual situations not covered by these
rules and regulations, or where strict
adherence to these rules would work
an injustice, deviations from the rules
and regulations are permitted.
The hearing board chairman and the
other members of the board should be
flexible and should not apply these
rules, regulations and rules of evidence
mechanically Y
The State Police argued that subsection
3-0 demonstrated the Superintendent's intent to make subsection 3-2b merely directory. "These rules and regulations are
guides . .. The hearing board ... should be
flexible and should not apply these rules
mechanically."48 Moreover, the regulation
specifically provides for "deviations"
when encountering "situations not
covered by these rules" or when the rules
"would work an injustice."49 The State
Police took the position that this case fell
within both exceptions: (1) it was a complex case with three defendants and thus a
situation not covered by the rules; (2) with
three co-defendants allegedly acting in concert, the permanent chair could have concluded that the interests of justice would
be best served by a combined trial heard
by five members.
Zeigler argued that his case did not come
within either exception. First, the rules expressly cover every case on the issue of
board size, i.e., "shall. .. appoint ... a
three-man board .... "50 Second, the exception to avoid injustice could only have
been intended to inure solely to the benefit
of the officer, not the agency. Judge
DeWaters ruled that subsection 3-2b mandated a three-member board and that nothing in subsection 3-0 undermined that
mandate in this case.

DUE PROCESS OF lAW
Having resolved the case on statutory
construction grounds, the court had no
need to rule on the constitutional issue.
Nonetheless, the court addressed due process briefly.
Zeigler had requested the court to order
three three-person boards. Although the
court ordered a three-person board, it
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refused to sever the case into three separate
boards. Judge DeWaters noted that nothing in either the LEOBOR or the
Maryland State Police Administrative
Manual controls the situation. He stated
that this could best be ruled on by the
hearing board, using the same considerations that a court uses in granting or denying severance to criminal defendants.
However, he recognized the strength of
the due process argument and stated: "I
think. the Board has to be extremely careful in making [the severance] decision ... ,
because if there is any kind of conflict,
anything that will work any injustice
resulting of him being tried with one or
two of the others, then it's going to get
here on appeal[51] and be sent back for an
independent hearing because of that conflict ... "52
In Mathews 'tI. Eldridge,53 the Supreme
Court enunciated a three-part balancing
test for ascertaining whether an administrative agency has satisfied the requirements of due process. The Court stated:
First, the private interest that will be
affected by the official action; second,
the risk of an erroneous deprivation of
such interest through the procedures
used, and the probable value, if any, of
additional or substitute procedural
safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the preparation involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirements would entail.S4
This test involves balancing costs and benefits to determine what kind of hearing
due process requires.55 The greater the
potential harm, the heavier the burden on
the administrative agency to provide a procedurally fairer hearing. Similarly, the
smaller the burden on the agency, the less
need for potential harm before requiring
the agency to accommodate.
Zeigler argued that the special order
established a hearing procedure that (1)
had a high degree of risk of unfairness in
the fact finding process, (2) had an
appearance of unfairness in the fact finding
process, and (3) violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).56 Moreover,
he argued that the administrative burden
imposed on the State Police to eliminate
these three problems and provide due process was de minimus. An examination of
each of the three parts of the Supreme
Court's test resulted in the following:

(1) The private interest affected by
the official action.
A non-probationary public employee

has a constitutionally protected property
interest requiring due process of law. 57 The
Supreme Court stated that police officers
"are not relegated to a watered-down version of constitutional rights.... "58 In

Nichols

'tI.

Baltimore Police Department, 59

the court of special appeals described the
legislative intent of the LEOBOR as follows: "The purpose of the LEOBOR is to
guarantee to those law-enforcement officers embraced therein procedural safeguards during investigation and hearing of
matters concerned with disciplinary action
against the officer.... In enacting the
LEOBOR, the Legislature vested in lawenforcement officers certain 'rights' not
available to the general public."60

(2) The risk of deprivation through
the procedures used and the probable value of additional or substitute
procedureal safeguards.
The special order established a fivemember hearing board to hear simultaneously three separate cases, involving different charges, against three different
defendants. Moreover, the order provided
for three separate, yet greatly overlapping,
trier of fact panels to simultaneously hear
three cases. Multiple triers of fact for
simultaneously tried defendants is highly
disfavored.
In Scarborough 'tI. State,61 two defendants
were tried jointly, with a separate jury
empaneled to hear each case. Although
finding no reversible error in that case,

UThe purpose of the
LEOBOR is to
guarantee . .. procedural safeguards . .. "

nevertheless, the court stated that such a
procedure has too many risks of prejudice
to a fair trial, concluding that "we join the
other courts in strongly condemning the
use of dual juries."62 This condemnation
has been implicitly extended to any jointly
tried defendants having different triers of
fact. In Nair 'tI. State,63 the court of special
appeals relied upon Scarborough to
"strongly disapprove of the practice of
conducting joint and simultaneous trials of
co-defendants" when one has the court as

trier of fact and one has a jury.64
Zeigler argued that his case presented a
procedure considerably worse than that in
Scarborough in two ways. First, in his case,
the triers of fact also would be the triers of
law, i.e., the court. By the very nature of
the process, the five board members would
commingle their thoughts about the case
as it progressed. The special order provided that the "five members ... will hear the
entire case against all three defendants and
participate in the decision making process
pertaining to motions, evidence, etc."
Second, not only were the board
members intended to commingle their
thoughts while serving as the triers of law,
they were intended to commingle their
thoughts while serving as triers of fact. In
Scarborough, no finder of fact ever deliberated on the merits of the case with a
finder of fact from the other panel. In
Zeigler's case, on the other hand, every
finder of fact would always deliberate with
a finder of fact who served on another
defendant's panel. Moreover, in this case,
the prosecution was asserting that there
was one cover-up with complicity among
three officers. Consequently, there would
be a subtle, yet strong, pressure to render
consistent verdicts. Upon deliberation on
the cases of whichever officers were
resolved second and third, two of the three
members of the board would deliberate
knowing the verdict in the preceding cases,
having just rendered them.
Both the "judge of law versus judge of
fact" problem and the "judge of fact in
multiple cases" problem would be exacerbated in Zeigler's case by the fact that the
members of the board would be lay personnel. Although a judge can be expected
to fulfill these roles simultaneously, differentiating and excluding mentally, as necessary, a non-judge cannot be expected to
accomplish this task. In short, the hearing
board procedure made a fair hearing
unrealistic, if not almost impossible. 6S
It is true that Scarborough was a criminal
case and that Zeigler is an administrative
adjudicatory hearing. Nonetheless, the
Supreme Court has recognized that
because an administrative agency does not
follow rules as strict as the judiciary, the
need to measure the adjudicatory proceedings against the requirements of due process is even greater. In Ohio Bell Telephone
Co. 'tI. Public Utilities Commission, 66 Justice
Cardoza stated:
Regulatory commissions have been
invested with broad police powers
within the sphere of duty assigned to
them by law. Even in quasi-judicial
proceedings their informed and expert
judgment exacts and receives a proper

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - J8.31The Law Forum-ll

deference from courts when it has been
reached with due submission to constitutional restraints. Indeed, much that they
do within the realm of administrative discretion is exempt from supervision if those
restraints have been obeyed. All the more
insistent is the need, when power has been
bestowed so freely, that the "inexorable
safeguard" of a fair and open hearing be
maintained in its integrity. The right to
such a hearing is one of "the rudiments of
fair play" assured to every litigant by the
fourteenth amendment as a minimal requirement. There can be no compromise
on the footing of convenience or expediency or because of a natural desire to be rid
of harassing delay, when that minimal requirement has been neglected or ignored. 67
The Court has also stated that whenever
the administrative agency's action is adjudicatory, "it is imperative [to] use the
procedures which have been associated
with the judicial process."68
Due process is not only concerned with
the risk of unfairness but also the appearance of unfairness. In Marshall v. ferrieo,
Inc.,69 the Supreme Court stated that the
"Due Process Clause ... helps to guarantee
that life, liberty, or property will not be
taken on the basis of erroneous or distorted conception of the facts or the law.
At the same time, it preserves both the appearance and reality of fairness ... "70 In
Fleck v. King County/I the Court of Appeals of Washington, in applying the "appearance of fairness doctrine," stated the
following:
The administrative tribunals which
perform judicial or quasi-judicial functions must be as above suspicion and
reproach as courts themselves. When
the circumstances are such that the
conduct of one member of a tribunal
may have infected the independent decision making process of others on the
tribunal, the potential exists for the
weakening of public confidence in the
operation of the agency, and actions
taken by boards, commissions, tribunals or agencies under such a cloud
must disappear.... A petitioner or litigant is entitled to a decision arrived at
by the separate members of the body
uncommitteed, unallied, and unfettered at the commencement of their
deliberations.71
Zeigler argued that the risks that were
soundly denounced in Scarborough were so
greatly multiplied in his case as to unconstitutionally deprive him of due process of law, particularly when examining

the value of additional or substitute procedural safeguards. The appointment of a
separate three-member hearing board for
each of three separate hearings would resolve the constitutional defect.
Additionally, the fact finding process established by the special order violated the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA).73
To the extent that the APA does not conflict with the LEOBOR/4 it controls
police department disciplinary hearing
boards. 75 Section 10-207(b) provides that
when hearing a contested case, "[t]he hearing officer shalL' (1) conduct the hearing;
and (2) submit in writing to the agency, official, or employee who delegated the
authority: (i) proposed findings of fact; and
(ii) proposed conclusions of law."76 This
section requires a hearing officer to perform both the function of conducting the

"Due process
is. . . concerned with
the risk [and]
appearance of
•
un),I'.atrness
. .. "

hearing and that of deciding (or recommending decision on) the merits. In
Zeigler's case, the special order assigned
five members to conduct the hearing
under subsection (b) (1) but only three
members to render a decision on the
merits under subsection (b) (2). Any procedure in which one number of hearing officers conducts the hearing and a different
number decides the merits of the case can
easily distort the "majority rule" decision
making process. 77
Moreover, section 10-213(a) (1) of the
APA provides that "an individual who is
not authorized to participate in the decision making process of a contested case
may not communicate ex parte with an individual who is involved in the process
with regard to any issue of law or fact in
the contested case."78 In this case, two of
the five hearing board members were "not
authorized to participate in the decision
making process" as to the merits of each of
the three cases, yet these two members
were instructed by the special order to
"communicate ex parte with [the three in-

individuals who were] involved in the process with regard to [motions, evidence,
etc.]." This violation would invalidate the
proceeding,79
(3) The fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute
procedureal requirements would entail for the governmental agency.
The administrative burden in constituting three separate three-member hearingboards is de minimus, both in the abstract
and when weighed against the harm in the
Zeigler case. The court in Scarborough recognized that the potential problems caused
by a multiple fact finder scenario greatly
outweigh any administrative ease that such
a procedure may afford. The court stated
that "appropriate safeguards necessary to
protect the rights of defendants in such a
trial would be more time consuming than
if separate trials were ordered."80 In H;Yt
v. Police Commissioner,81 the Baltimore City Police Department, following the 1974
police strike that involved 901 officers,
conducted disciplinary hearings against
130 officers. A separate hearing board was
constituted for each officer. Certainly, the
formation of two additional three-member
hearing boards would be a small administrative price to pay to ensure due process
of law.

ATTORNEY'S FEES
In Gardner v. Broderick,82 the Supreme
Court prohibited placing a chilling effect
on the constitutional rights of law enforcement officers. Section 733 of the
LEOBOR prohibits creating a chilling effect on LEOBOR rights. 83
Zeigler asked the court to award reasonable attorney's fees, arguing that without
such an award there was an economic chilling effect upon his ability to even seek that
to which he was entitled. He noted that
the judicial relief sought in this case under
the show cause provision was requested administratively in writing seven months
earlier. Law enforcement agencies are
represented by government-employed attorneys. Consequently, the cost of litigation receives relatively little consideration
by the agency. Zeigler argued that even if
he prevailed on the merits, he would still
be penalized an amount equal to the cost
of attorney's fees. Only by an award of attorney's fees could the court place him in
the position of being afforded his rights
without being penalized for their assertion.
In Cochran v. Anderson,84 the court of
special appeals stated that "[t]he purpose
of [section 734] obviously is ... to assure
that the police agency will do what the law
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requires."85 Anderson vested in the circuit
courts broad judicial equitable relief.
Zeigler urged the court to fashion its
remedy broadly enough so that he would
not receive severe economic punishment,
imposed indirectly by the State Police by
forcing him to litigate to make the agency
obey its own rules. Moreover, such a
remedy may have the effect of making the
agency think. twice before similarly denying a constitutional, statutory, or regulatory benefit to one of its officers.
Judge DeWaters denied attorney's fees,
stating that "the situation is sufficiendy
complicated and has sufficient merit on
each side that it does not warrant the
Court to award attorney's fees."86

CONCLUSION
Law enforcement officers play a vital
role in society. Their responsibilities are
great and their compensation is small. The
problems of law enforcement should not
be exacerbated by an adversarial rdationship between law enforcement agencies
and law enforcement officers. Agencies
have consistendy denied constitutional,
statutory, and regulatory protection to
their own officers. As a last resort, officers
are litigating to obtain their rights. Court
decisions, such as Zeigler 1:1. Maryland State
Police, ordering law enforcement agencies
to respect the rights of their officers, may
produce the necessary balance between
agency and officer that will enable them to
concentrate less on each other and more
on their vital mission.
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